No. 105: When Should a Firm Employ its Workers? A Relational Contracting Approach
Authors
Abstract
A principal hiring an agent chooses between employment and self-employment. Under employment, the principal can control the manner in which the agent performs the assignment (the ‘work design’), whereas this is legally forbidden under self-employment. Due to incomplete contracts, the relationship is governed by relational agreements, which are influenced by the allocation of control. We show that employment typically results in an over-demanding work design, compared to an under-demanding work design under self-employment, and that employment relationships are more rigid and better suited to favorable production environments. We further examine the impact of taxation, minimum wages, and formal performance pay.
To cite this article
Schöttner, A., & Upton, H. (2022). When Should a Firm Employ its Workers? A Relational Contracting Approach. TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 105. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4257746