How to Improve Small Firms' Payroll Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

Authors

Philipp DörrenbergPhilipp DörrenbergPAPfrang, AlinaSJSchmitz, Jan

Abstract

Payroll tax evasion by firms is widespread and threatens welfare systems, yet little is known about how to combat it. We report results from a randomized control trial targeting small firms in a middle-income country. We randomize announced audit probabilities (1%, 10%, 40%, or 60%) on the firm level and implement several novel types of moral appeals (emphasizing tax-financed goods). We show that both deterrence and moral measures improve payroll tax compliance. Higher audit probabilities generate 50% more additional revenues than moral appeals. An additional treatment with ambiguous audit probability shows that behavioral factors play a limited role in deterrence effects.

To cite this article

Dörrenberg, P., Pfrang, A. & Schmitz, J. (2025). How to Improve Small Firms' Payroll Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment. Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 4(3). https://doi.org/10.1086/737569