No. 38: Analysts’ strategic information revelation in conference calls
Autoren
Zusammenfassung
We study information revelation via analysts’ questions in earnings conference calls and its implications for firms’ information environments. Better-informed analysts (who have higher ex-ante forecast accuracy) reveal less new information in their questions than less-informed analysts. Consistent with strategic safeguarding of their information advantage, analysts reveal less (more) information when exposed to strong competition (high information uncertainty). Information revelation is linked to ex-post benefits (higher absolute forecast accuracy) and costs (lower relative forecast accuracy) to analysts. Finally, it is associated with the informativeness of managers’ answers and affects trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and returns. We conclude that analysts’ strategic information revelation shapes firms’ information environments.
Zitiervorschlag
Haag, J., Hofmann, C., Paulus, A., Schwaiger, N., & Sellhorn, T. (2022). Analysts’ strategic information revelation in conference calls. TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 38. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853869