No. 38: Analysts’ strategic information revelation in conference calls

Autoren

Christian HofmannChristian HofmannNina SchwaigerNina SchwaigerThorsten SellhornThorsten SellhornAlexander PaulusAlexander PaulusHaag, JuliaHaag, Julia

Zusammenfassung

We study information revelation via analysts’ questions in earnings conference calls and its implications for firms’ information environments. Better-informed analysts (who have higher ex-ante forecast accuracy) reveal less new information in their questions than less-informed analysts. Consistent with strategic safeguarding of their information advantage, analysts reveal less (more) information when exposed to strong competition (high information uncertainty). Information revelation is linked to ex-post benefits (higher absolute forecast accuracy) and costs (lower relative forecast accuracy) to analysts. Finally, it is associated with the informativeness of managers’ answers and affects trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and returns. We conclude that analysts’ strategic information revelation shapes firms’ information environments.

Zitiervorschlag

Haag, J., Hofmann, C., Paulus, A., Schwaiger, N., & Sellhorn, T. (2022). Analysts’ strategic information revelation in conference calls. TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 38. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853869