Mandatory Binding Arbitration – Economic Evaluation of an International Norm

Autoren

Dirk SimonsDirk Simonsh.c. Dr. h.c. Caren Sureth-Sloaneh.c. Dr. h.c. Caren Sureth-SloaneDennis VoellerDennis VoellerSESociety, Expert Group Transfer Pricing of the SchmalenbachDCDanner, ChristianLMLagarden, MartinMJMartini, Jan ThomasNRNiemann, RainerOAOestreicher, AndreasSJSassmann, JulianeSUSchreiber, Ulrich

Zusammenfassung

Dispute resolution has gained prominence in international taxation responding to a growing risk of tax disputes driven by four factors: (i) increased international mobility of the tax base (ii) non-OECD members challenging existing tax allocations, (iii) stronger formalization of the arm’s length principle and (iv) expansion of anti-avoidance rules. Despite business preferences for greater certainty, relatively few countries have committed to mandatory binding arbitration. This article’s goal is threefold: identifying multinationals’ cost-benefit calculus for initiating international dispute resolution, examining countries’ incentives to (not) support efficient arbitration procedures and discussing binding arbitration in the context of alternative cross-border profit allocation rules.

Zitiervorschlag

Expert Group Transfer Pricing of the Schmalenbach Society, Danner, C., Lagarden, M., Martini, J. T., Niemann, R., Oestreicher, A., Sassmann, J., Schreiber, U., Simons, D., Sureth-Sloane, C., & Voeller, D. (2026). Mandatory Binding Arbitration – Economic Evaluation of an International Norm. International Transfer Pricing Journal, 33(5). https://doi.org/10.59403/pmxpqx